Alexithymia explains increased empathic personal distress in individuals with and without Eating Disorders by Brewer, Rebecca et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1177/1747021818816051
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Brewer, R., Cook, R., Cardi, V., Treasure, J., Catmur, C., & Bird, G. (2019). Alexithymia explains increased
empathic personal distress in individuals with and without Eating Disorders. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 72(7), 1827-1836. https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021818816051
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. Sep. 2019
	 1	
Accepted	13th	October	2018	for	publication	in	Quarterly	Journal	of	Experimental	Psychology					
Alexithymia	explains	increased	empathic	personal	distress	in	individuals	
with	and	without	Eating	Disorders	
	
		Rebecca	Brewer1,	Richard	Cook2,	Valentina	Cardi3,	Janet	Treasure3,	Caroline	Catmur4,	&	Geoffrey	Bird5,6	
	
	
	1Department	of	Psychology,	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	London	2Department	of	Psychology,	City	University	London	3Section	of	Eating	Disorders,	Institute	of	Psychiatry,	Psychology	and	Neuroscience,	King’s	College	London	4Department	of	Psychology,	Institute	of	Psychiatry,	Psychology	and	Neuroscience,	King’s	College	London	5Department	of	Experimental	Psychology,	University	of	Oxford	6MRC	Social,	Genetic	&	Developmental	Psychiatry	Centre,	Institute	of	Psychiatry,	Psychology	and	Neuroscience,	King’s	College	London		Address	for	correspondence:	Rebecca	Brewer,	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	London,	Egham	Hill,	Egham,	TW20	0EX.	Rebecca.Brewer@rhul.ac.uk	
	 	
	 2	
Abstract	
	It	 is	often	assumed	that	empathy	 impairments	are	common	 in	 individuals	with	eating	disorders	(EDs),	but	empirical	work	has	been	limited	and	produced	mixed	results,	 making	 the	 clinical	 features	 and	 treatment	 needs	 of	 this	 population	difficult	 to	determine.	Alexithymia,	 characterised	by	difficulties	 identifying	 and	describing	one’s	own	emotions,	frequently	co-occurs	with	EDs,	and	is	associated	with	 atypical	 recognition	 of,	 and	 empathy	 for,	 others’	 emotions.	 The	 current	study	used	an	existing	empathy	for	pain	paradigm	to	determine	whether	atypical	empathy	 in	 EDs	 stems	 from	 co-occurring	 alexithymia,	 rather	 than	 EDs	 per	
se.	Empathy	 (specifically	 personal	 distress	 in	 response	 to	 others’	 pain)	 was	assessed	 in	 individuals	with	EDs	 (N	=	21)	 and	an	alexithymia-matched	 control	group	(N	=	22).	Participants	were	simultaneously	members	of	a	high	alexithymia	(N	 =	 16)	 or	 low	 alexithymia	 (N	 =	 27)	 group,	 allowing	 the	 independent	contributions	of	alexithymia	and	EDs	to	be	determined.	Participants	 judged	the	laterality	of	hands	and	feet	in	painful	and	non-painful	situations,	and	the	degree	of	 empathic	 interference	 on	 RTs	 was	 measured.	 Results	 indicated	 that	observation	 of	 painful	 stimuli	 impacted	 task	 performance	 in	 those	 with	 high	levels	 of	 alexithymia	 more	 than	 those	 with	 low	 levels,	 but	 no	 effect	 of	 ED	diagnosis	 was	 observed.	 These	 findings	 suggest	 that	 co-occurring	 alexithymia	explains	 increased	 empathic	 personal	 distress	 in	 ED	 populations.	 Atypical	empathy	may	therefore	not	be	a	core	feature	of	EDs,	and	interventions	aimed	at	improving	empathy-related	social	functioning	may	only	be	necessary	for	patients	who	 also	 have	 alexithymia.	 These	 findings	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	determining	the	 influence	of	co-occurring	alexithymia	when	assessing	empathy	in	clinical	populations.		Keywords:	Alexithymia;	Empathy;	Personal	Distress;	Eating	Disorders	
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Feeding	 and	 Eating	 Disorders	 (hereafter	 EDs)	 are	 psychological	 disorders	characterised	 by	 disturbed	 and	 inappropriate	 patterns	 of	 eating	 (American	Psychiatric	 Association,	 2013).	 Three	 subtypes	 have	 been	 recognised;	 Bulimia	Nervosa	 (BN)	 (associated	with	 periods	 of	 bingeing,	 followed	 by	 inappropriate	compensatory	behaviour),	Anorexia	Nervosa	 (AN)	 (associated	with	emaciation,	distorted	body	image	and	an	intense	fear	of	gaining	weight)	and	more	recently,	Binge	Eating	Disorder	(BED)	(characterised	by	consumption	of	more	 food	than	most	 people	 would	 consume	 under	 similar	 circumstances,	 and	 lack	 of	 control	over	eating	behaviours).	Although	not	defined	as	a	core	feature	of	EDs,	deficits	in	social	 and	 emotional	 functioning,	 such	 as	 an	 atypical	 cognitive	 bias	 towards	emotionally	 salient	 stimuli,	 impaired	 recognition	 and	 regulation	 of	 one’s	 own	emotions,	 and	 a	 reduced	 ability	 to	 identify	 others’	 emotions	 and	 other	mental	states,	have	often	been	reported	in	this	population	(Oldershaw	et	al.,	2011).	The	ability	 to	 empathise	 is	 crucial	 for	 successful	 social	 and	 emotional	 functioning,	and	has	also	been	reported	to	be	impaired	in	those	with	EDs	(Gillberg,	Råstam,	&	Gillberg,	1995;	Morris,	Bramham,	Smith,	&	Tchanturia,	2014),	 though	empirical	evidence	 has	 been	 inconsistent	 (Courty	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Hambrook,	 Tchanturia,	Schmidt,	Russell,	&	Treasure,	2008).		While	the	concept	of	empathy	encompasses	multiple	processes,	it	can	be	defined	as	comprising	one’s	affective	response	to	one’s	judgement	of	another’s	emotional	state	 (affect	 sharing),	 and	 the	 cognitive	 process	 of	 identifying	 another’s	 state	(emotion	identification;	Coll	et	al.,	2017).	The	negative	emotional	state	arising	in	the	empathiser	as	a	result	of	identification	of	the	other’s	negative	state	produces	a	 state	 of	 personal	 distress	 in	 the	 empathiser;	which	 is	 thought	 to	 be	 reduced	when	the	aversive	state	is	attributed	to	the	other	rather	than	the	self.	After	this	‘self-other	 distinction’	 has	 occurred,	 the	 reduced	 personal	 distress	 may	 be	accompanied	 by	 empathic	 concern	 for	 the	 other	 (Bird	 &	 Viding,	 2014;	 Davis,	1983;	Decety	&	Lamm,	2006;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2007).	Reduced	empathic	concern	for	 others’	 emotional	 states,	 through	 atypical	 affect	 sharing,	 emotion	identification,	or	self-other	distinction,	is	likely	to	impair	social	functioning	more	generally,	 and	 place	 strain	 on	 relationships	 between	 individuals	 with	 ED	 and	their	 support	 networks.	 As	 individuals	 with	 EDs	 are	 thought	 to	 use	 ED	
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behaviours	 (such	 as	 restricting	 food	 intake,	 bingeing	 and	 over-exercising)	 as	 a	means	of	coping	with	emotional	difficulties	or	distress	(Wagener	&	Much,	2010),	it	is	possible	that	atypical	empathy	and	its	consequences	(such	as	reduced	social	support)	 may	 exacerbate	 ED	 symptoms.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 suggested	 that	difficulties	with	empathy	lead	to	poorer	recovery	from	EDs	(Gillberg,	Rastam,	&	Gllberg,	 1994),	 making	 increased	 understanding	 of	 these	 difficulties	 crucial.	Determining	 whether	 empathy	 impairments	 are	 a	 genuine	 feature	 of	 EDs	 is	therefore	 an	 urgent	 requirement,	 in	 order	 to	 optimise	 the	 design	 and	implementation	of	suitable	interventions,	and	to	maximise	successful	treatment	outcomes.			Multiple	studies	have	observed	difficulties	in	identification	of	others’	emotion	in	those	 with	 EDs	 (Harrison,	 Sullivan,	 Tchanturia,	 &	 Treasure,	 2009;	 Kucharska-Pietura,	Nikolaou,	Masiak,	&	Treasure,	2004;	Legenbauer,	Vocks,	&	Ruddel,	2008;	Pollatos,	 Herbert,	 Schandry,	 &	 Gramann,	 2008),	 although	 findings	 have	 been	mixed,	and	effect	sizes	are	often	small	(Caglar-Nazali	et	al.,	2014;	Oldershaw	et	al.,	2011).	Previous	 investigation	of	 the	subsequent	stages	of	empathy	 (beyond	emotion	identification,	such	as	affect	sharing	and	empathic	concern)	in	EDs	has	relied	almost	exclusively,	however,	on	self-report	measures.	Surprisingly,	 there	is	 little	 evidence	 for	 reduced	empathy	in	 EDs	 using	 these	 measures,	 despite	various	anecdotal	and	clinical	reports.	While	some	authors	have	found	decreased	levels	 of	 self-reported	 empathy	 in	 those	with	 EDs	 (Morris	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 and	 in	non-clinical	samples	with	high	levels	of	disordered	eating	(Costarelli,	Demerzi,	&	Stamou,	 2009),	many	 studies	 have	 found	no	 association	between	 self-reported	empathy	and	EDs	 (Courty	et	al.,	2013;	Guttman	&	Laporte,	2000;	Hambrook	et	al.,	2008;	Lulé	et	al.,	2014).	When	specific	aspects	of	empathy	are	examined,	 in	contrast	 to	empathic	concern,	 the	personal	distress	 facet	of	empathy	 is	usually	increased,	 rather	 than	 decreased,	 in	 ED	 samples	 in	 those	 studies	where	 group	differences	 are	 observed	 (Beadle,	 Paradiso,	 Salerno,	 &	 McCormick,	 2013;	Duchesne	 et	 al.,	 2012;	Guttman	&	Laporte,	 2002).	 To	our	 knowledge,	 only	 one	study	 has	 directly	 investigated	 online	 empathic	 responses	 of	 individuals	 with	EDs	 to	 others’	 emotional	 states	 (Cardi	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 In	 this	 study,	 participants	viewed	films	of	others	in	affective	situations,	and	were	required	to	report	their	
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own	emotional	 responses.	No	differences	between	 the	 responses	of	 those	with	and	without	EDs	were	observed.			While	 assessing	empathy	objectively	 is	 challenging,	 tasks	have	been	developed	that	 are	 sensitive	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 personal	 distress	 evoked	 by	 another’s	 pain	(Avenanti,	 Minio-Paluello,	 Bufalari,	 &	 Aglioti,	 2009;	 Borgomaneri,	 Gazzola,	 &	Avenanti,	 2014;	 De	 Coster,	 Andres,	 &	 Brass,	 2014).	 These	 tasks	 rely	 on	objectively	 assessing	 responses	 to	 another’s	 pain,	 for	 example	 by	 measuring	muscle	 activity	 in	 response	 to	 another’s	 pain	 in	 the	 corresponding	 muscle	(Avenanti,	 Bueti,	 Galati,	 &	 Aglioti,	 2005;	 de	 Guzman,	 Bird,	 Banissy,	 &	 Catmur,	2016),	 neural	 activity	 while	 viewing	 others’	 pain	 (Coll,	 Grégoire,	 Eugène,	 &	Jackson,	2017;	Gu	&	Han,	2007;	Jackson,	Meltzoff,	&	Decety,	2005),	or	response	times	to	stimuli	depicting	others	 in	pain	(Gu	et	al.,	2010,	2012).	Previous	work	has	found,	for	example,	that	viewing	others’	hands	and	feet	in	painful	(relative	to	non-painful)	 situations	 leads	 to	 slower	 responses	 when	 performing	 a	 pain-irrelevant	 laterality	 judgement	 (indicating	whether	 a	 right	 or	 left	 hand	 or	 foot	was	presented)	(Gu	et	al.,	2010).	This	task	was	therefore	selected	in	the	current	study	to	provide	an	objective	assessment	of	empathy-related	personal	distress	in	those	with,	and	without,	a	diagnosis	of	EDs.		In	 addition	 to	 providing	 an	 objective	measure	 of	 empathy	 in	 EDs,	 the	 current	study	 also	 sought	 to	 test	 the	 impact	 of	 co-occurring	 alexithymia,	 a	 sub-clinical	condition	 characterised	 by	 difficulties	 identifying	 and	 describing	 one’s	 own	emotions	(Nemiah,	Freyberger,	&	Sifneos,	1976),	on	empathy	in	those	with	EDs.	Alexithymia	has	consistently	been	associated	with	atypical	empathy	(Bernhardt	&	Singer,	2012;	Bernhardt	et	al.,	2013;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2007;	Silani	et	al.,	2008),	including	 increased	 self-reported	 personal	 distress	 (Guttman	&	 Laporte,	 2002;	Moriguchi	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Patil	 &	 Silani,	 2014)	 in	 those	 with	 and	 without	 EDs	(Beadle	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Alexithymia	 is	 also	 associated	 with	 developmental	dysfunction,	 or	 atypical	 structure,	 of	 the	 Anterior	 Insula	 (AI)	 and	 Anterior	Cingulate	Cortex	(ACC)	(Bernhardt	&	Singer,	2012;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2007;	Singer,	Critchley,	&	Preuschoff,	2009),	which	are	some	of	the	neural	regions	supporting	empathy	(Bernhardt	&	Singer,	2012;	Decety,	2011;	Lamm,	Rütgen,	&	Wagner,	in	
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press),	 and	 areas	 in	 which	 both	 function	 and	 structure	 are	 associated	 with	individual	differences	in	personal	distress	(Banissy,	Kanai,	Walsh,	&	Rees,	2012;	Cheetham,	2009;	Eres,	Decety,	Louis,	&	Molenberghs,	2015).		Importantly	for	the	current	study,	an	elevated	prevalence	of	alexithymia	relative	to	the	typical	population	has	been	observed	in	individuals	with	AN,	BN	and	BED	(Bourke,	Taylor,	Parker,	&	Bagby,	1992;	Cochrane,	Brewerton,	Wilson,	&	Hodges,	1993;	Jimerson,	Wolfe,	Franko,	Covino,	&	Sifneos,	1994;	Pinaquy,	Chabrol,	Simon,	Louvet,	 &	 Barbe,	 2003;	 Rozenstein,	 Latzer,	 Stein,	 &	 Eviatar,	 2011),	meaning	 it	could	be	alexithymia,	rather	than	EDs	themselves,	that	explains	atypical	empathy	in	those	with	EDs.	Indeed,	previously	inconsistent	findings	relating	to	empathy	in	EDs	 suggest	 considerable	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 ED	 population,	 with	 some	individuals	 self-reporting	 increased	 personal	 distress	 and	 reduced	 empathic	concern,	 and	 some	 not.	 Explaining	 this	 heterogeneity	 is	 clearly	 a	 valuable	research	 aim	 as	 it	 will	 enable	 personalised	 interventions	 to	 be	 administered;	those	 patients	 who	 experience	 increased	 personal	 distress	 can	 be	 taught	strategies	 to	 engage	 in	 self-other	 distinction,	 reducing	 their	 levels	 of	 personal	distress	and	increasing	empathic	concern	(de	Guzman	et	al.,	2016;	Santiesteban	et	al.,	2012).	Alexithymia	is	a	plausible	candidate	to	explain	the	empathy-related	heterogeneity	 in	 those	 with	 EDs;	 the	 ‘alexithymia	 hypothesis’	 (Bird	 &	 Cook,	2013)	 posits	 that,	 where	 alexithymia	 co-occurs	 with	 clinical	 disorders,	 it	 may	explain	 atypicalities	 in	 emotion	 processing	 and	 empathy,	 over	 and	 above	 the	disorder	itself	(Bird	et	al.,	2010;	Bird,	Press,	&	Richardson,	2011;	Brewer,	Cook,	Cardi,	Treasure,	&	Bird,	2015;	Cook,	Brewer,	Shah,	&	Bird,	2013;	Oakley,	Brewer,	Bird,	 &	 Catmur,	 2016).	 Indeed,	 alexithymia	 has	 been	 found	 to	 explain	 the	emotion	identification	stage	of	empathy	in	those	with	EDs	(Brewer	et	al.,	2015).	It	 is	 therefore	possible	 that	 the	mixed	 findings	 concerning	atypical	 empathy	 in	EDs	are	due	to	previous	samples	differing	according	to	alexithymia	presence	and	severity;	where	 deficits	 have	 been	 observed,	 alexithymia	 rates	may	 have	 been	elevated	in	the	ED	group,	 leading	to	observation	of	a	group	difference.	As	most	previous	 studies	 have	 not	 measured	 alexithymia,	 or	 matched	 ED	 and	 control	groups	 according	 to	 alexithymia	 severity,	 it	 has	 been	 impossible	 to	 determine	the	 independent	 contribution	 of	 alexithymia	 and	 EDs	 to	 empathy.	 The	 current	
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study	was	therefore	a	preliminary	investigation	into	the	relative	contributions	of	alexithymia	 and	 EDs	 to	 the	 increased	 personal	 distress	 seen	 in	 individuals	diagnosed	with	EDs,	using	a	self-report	empathy	measure	and	an	objective	test	of	responses	to	another’s	pain.			
Method	
	
Participants	
	21	females	with	an	ED	(18	AN,	three	BN;	mean	age	=	25.9	years,	SD	=	6.0)	and	22	females	with	no	past	or	present	psychological	diagnosis	(mean	age	=	23.0	years,	
SD	 =	 6.3)	 participated	 in	 this	 study.	 18	 of	 the	 21	 ED	 participants	 were	 right	handed	 (3	 left	 handed).	 All	 22	 of	 the	 control	 participants	 were	 right	 handed.	Participants	 were	 pre-screened	 using	 the	 Toronto	 Alexithymia	 Scale	 (TAS-20;	Bagby,	Parker,	&	Taylor,	1994)	in	order	to	ensure	a	broad	range	of	alexithymia	scores	 in	 each	 group.	 The	 ED	 and	 control	 groups	 were	 therefore	 matched	according	to	alexithymia	severity	[t(41)	=	1.35,	p	=	.19].	Seven	participants	in	the	control	group	and	nine	in	the	ED	group	met	the	criterion	for	severe	alexithymia	(TAS-20	 score	 >	 60).	 The	 16	 individuals	 reaching	 this	 criterion	 therefore	comprised	 the	high	alexithymia	group,	 and	 the	27	 individuals	not	meeting	 this	criterion	 comprised	 the	 low	 alexithymia	 group.	 These	 groups	 did	 not	 differ	according	to	ED	symptomatology,	measured	by	the	Eating	Disorder	Examination	Questionnaire	 (EDE-Q;	Mond,	 Hay,	 Rodgers,	 &	 Owen,	 2006)	 [t(41)	 =	 1.16,	 p	 =	.25].	 The	 study	 therefore	 had	 a	 between-participants	 design,	 in	 which	participants	 belonged	 to	 one	 of	 two	 ED	 groups	 and	 one	 of	 two	 alexithymia	groups	simultaneously.		All	individuals	with	EDs	were	diagnosed	by	independent	clinicians,	according	to	DSM-IV	 (American	 Psychiatric	 Association,	 1994)	 or	 DSM-V	 (American	Psychiatric	 Association,	 2013)	 criteria.	 Fourteen	 of	 the	 twenty-one	 ED	participants,	 who	 were	 diagnosed	 more	 than	 one	 year	 prior	 to	 study	participation,	also	completed	the	eating	disorders	section	of	the	research	version	
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of	 the	 SCID	 (Structured	Clinical	 Interview	 for	DSM-IV;	 First,	 Spitzer,	 Gibbon,	&	Williams,	2002)	to	assess	current	functioning.	One	member	of	the	ED	group	had	not	previously	been	diagnosed	by	a	clinician,	but	scored	above	the	recommended	cut-off	for	clinical	significance	on	the	EDE-Q,	had	a	BMI	below	the	healthy	weight	cut-off	(16.5)	and	met	criteria	for	‘Anorexia,	binge-purging	type’	according	to	the	SCID.	This	participant	was	not	an	outlier	 in	any	analysis,	and	her	exclusion	did	not	 alter	 the	 pattern	 of	 results.	 The	 ED	 group	 had	 significantly	 higher	 ED	symptomatology	(M	=	4.28,	SD	=	1.57),	assessed	by	the	EDE-Q,	than	the	control	group	(M	=	1.39,	SD	=	1.36)	[t(40)	=	6.17,	p	<	.01].			The	 two	ED	groups	did	not	differ	according	 to	age	 [t(41)	=	1.42,	p	=	 .16]	or	 IQ	[t(41)	=	.84,	p	=	.41],	measured	by	the	Wechsler	Abbreviated	Scale	of	Intelligence	(Wechsler,	 2011).	 The	 high	 and	 low	 alexithymia	 groups	 were	 also	 matched	according	to	age	[t(41)	=	 .45,	p	=	 .66]	and	IQ	[t(41)	=	1.80,	p	=	 .08].	Depression	levels	were	measured	in	all	participants	using	the	Depression,	Anxiety	and	Stress	Scale	 (DASS;	 Lovibond	 &	 Lovibond,	 1995).	 Depression	 differed	 significantly	between	the	ED	(M	=	24.0,	SD	=	9.89)	and	control	(M	=	5.29,	SD	=	6.73)	groups	[t(41)	 =	 7.20,	p	 <	 .01],	 but	 not	 between	 the	 high	 and	 low	 alexithymia	 groups.	Anxiety	was	higher	in	the	ED	(M	=	14.64,	SD	=	10.52)	than	control	(M	=	5.71,	SD	=	7.65)	 group	 [t(41)	 =	 -3.19,	 p	 =	 .003]	 and	 higher	 in	 the	 high	 alexithymia	 (M	 =	17.13,	SD	=	10.84)	 than	 low	alexithymia	(M	=	6.22,	SD	=	7.29)	group	 [t(41)	=	 -3.56,	p	=	.002].	Stress	was	higher	in	the	high	alexithymia	(M	=	30.56,	SD	=	22.77)	than	low	alexithymia	(M	=	14.93,	SD	=	10.56)	group	[t(41)	=	-3.07,	p	=	.004].	All	participants	 also	 completed	 the	 Interpersonal	 Reactivity	 Index	 (IRI)	 (Davis,	1980),	 assessing	 four	 separate	 facets	 of	 empathy;	 perspective	 taking	 (the	tendency	 to	 take	another’s	perspective),	 fantasy	 (the	 tendency	 to	 identify	with	fictional	 characters)	 empathic	 concern	 (the	 tendency	 to	 feel	 compassion	 and	concern	for	others),	and	personal	distress	(the	tendency	to	experience	negative	emotions	 in	 response	 to	 another’s	 negative	 state).	 All	 questionnaire	measures	were	completed	prior	to	the	experiment.		
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Stimuli	and	materials		Stimuli	were	a	subset	of	those	used	in	a	previous	empathy	for	pain	task	(Gu	et	al.,	2010,	2012).	The	stimulus	set	comprised	160	digital	color	photographs	of	a	hand	or	a	foot,	 in	either	a	painful	or	non-painful	situation.	Equal	numbers	of	 left	and	right,	male	and	female	hands	and	feet	were	viewed.	Painful	stimuli	depicted	the	hand	or	 foot	being	harmed	 in	some	way	by	an	object	encountered	 in	everyday	life,	and	a	corresponding	non-painful	stimulus,	showing	the	same	(left	or	right)	hand	or	foot	with	the	object	in	an	unthreatening	position,	existed	for	each	painful	stimulus	(see	Figure	1	for	examples).	All	stimuli	were	presented	from	the	first-person	perspective.	Stimuli	were	presented	on	a	15”	LCD	screen	and	subtended	17°	x	11°	when	viewed	from	a	distance	of	60	cm.		 Figure	1		
Procedure	
	Stimuli	were	presented	 for	2500ms,	and	 followed	by	an	 inter-stimulus	 interval	(ISI)	 of	 1500ms.	 Participants	 were	 required	 to	 perform	 a	 speeded	 laterality	judgment	(indicating	whether	the	image	depicted	a	right	or	left	hand	or	foot)	in	the	4000ms	 following	stimulus	onset.	Each	stimulus	was	viewed	once,	yielding	160	 trials.	 Participants	 responded	by	pressing	 the	 left	 or	 right	 arrow	key	on	 a	laptop	keyboard.	All	participants	responded	using	their	index	and	middle	fingers	of	their	right	hand,	to	respond	with	‘left’	and	‘right’	respectively.	
	
	
Results	
	Self-reported	Empathy	Analysis	of	self-reported	empathy	was	conducted	using	alexithymia	group	(high	or	 low)	x	ED	group	(ED	or	control)	ANOVAs	 for	each	sub-scale	of	 the	 IRI.	Both	the	main	effects	of	alexithymia	[F(1,39)	=	9.06,	p	<	.01,	ŋ	=	.19,	95%	CI	for	ŋ	(.02,	.38)]	and	ED	diagnosis	[F(1,39)	=	11.79,	p	<	.01,	ŋ	=	.23,	95%	CI	for	ŋ	(.04,	.42)]	
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were	 significant	with	 respect	 to	 personal	 distress	 scores	 (Figure	 2),	 and	were	qualified	by	a	 significant	 interaction	between	 these	 factors	 [F(1,39)	=	4.78,	p	=	.035,	ŋ	=	.11,	95%	CI	for	ŋ	(0,	.30)].	The	high	alexithymia	group	(M	=	16.25,	SD	=	4.40)	 reported	 higher	 personal	 distress	 than	 the	 low	 alexithymia	 group	 (M	 =	11.85,	 SD	 =	 4.77),	 and	 the	 ED	 group	 (M	 =	 15.45,	 SD	 =	 5.37)	 reported	 higher	personal	 distress	 than	 the	 typical	 group	 (M	 =	 11.43,	 SD	 =	 3.85).	 Post-hoc	comparisons,	 however,	 indicated	 that	 the	 perception	 of	 personal	 distress	 in	response	to	the	pain	of	another	was	only	elevated	-	in	comparison	with	the	low	alexithymia	control	group	-	when	an	individual	had	both	alexithymia	and	an	ED.	Those	 with	 high	 alexithymia	 and	 an	 ED	 (M	 =	 19.44,	 SD	 =	 2.74)	 reported	significantly	higher	personal	distress	than	those	with	low	alexithymia	and	an	ED	(M	=	12.69,	SD	=	5.02)	[t(20)	=	3.80,	p	=	.003],	those	with	high	alexithymia	and	no	ED	(M	=	12.14,	SD	=	1.86)	[t(14)	=	3.54,	p	=	.006],	and	those	with	low	alexithymia	and	 no	 ED	 (M	 =	 11.07,	 SD	 =	 4.57)	 [t(21)	 =	 4.78,	 p	<	 .001].	 There	 was	 also	 a	significant	main	effect	of	alexithymia	on	the	fantasy	scale	(FS)	of	the	IRI	[F(1,39)	=	 8.44,	p	 <	 .01,	ŋ	 =	 .18,	 95%	CI	 for	ŋ	 (.02,	 .37)],	whereby	 the	 low	 alexithymia	group	(M	=	18.30,	SD	=	8.47)	reported	increased	fantasising	relative	to	the	high	alexithymia	group		(M	=	11.25,	SD	=	4.91).	The	low	alexithymia	group	(M	=	20.74,	
SD	 =	 4.51)	 also	 reported	 higher	 empathic	 concern	 for	 others	 than	 the	 high	alexithymia	group	(M	=	17.75,	SD	=	5.03)	[F(1,39)	=	4.16,	p	<	.05,	ŋ	=	.10,	95%	CI	for	ŋ	(0,	.28)].	No	further	significant	main	or	interaction	effects	were	observed.		 Figure	2				Empathy	for	Pain	Task		Analysis	 of	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 laterality	 judgment,	 estimated	 by	 d’	 (Green	 &	Swets,	1966)	using	a	two-way	(ED	group	x	alexithymia	group)	ANOVA	produced	no	 significant	 main	 or	 interaction	 effects	 for	 the	 Painful-Non-painful	 d’	difference.	Accuracy	therefore	appears	to	be	unaffected	by	either	alexithymia	or	ED	symptom	severity	in	the	current	task.	
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	RT	analyses	were	conducted	having	removed	inaccurate	trials	and	any	trials	 in	which	RTs	were	more	than	2	SDs	from	the	participant’s	mean	RT.	As	in	previous	studies,	 RTs	 were	 significantly	 greater	 when	 judging	 laterality	 in	 painful	 than	non-painful	 situations,	 in	 both	 the	 ED	 group	 (Painful	mean	 RT	 =	 929ms,	 SD	 =	231ms;	Non-painful	 RT	 =	 909ms,	 SD	 =	 216ms)	 [t(21)	 =	 3.20,	p	 <	 .01]	 and	 the	typical	group	(Painful	mean	RT	=	949ms,	SD	=	171ms;	Non-painful	RT	=	919ms,	
SD	 =	 164ms)	 [t(20)	 =	 3.86,	 p	 <	 .01],	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 low	 alexithymia	 group	(Painful	mean	RT	=	891ms,	SD	=	183ms;	Non-painful	RT	=	875ms,	SD	=	172ms)	[t(26)	 =	 2.61,	 p	 =	 .015]	 and	 the	 high	 alexithymia	 group	 (Painful	 mean	 RT	 =	1019ms,	SD	=	212ms;	Non-painful	RT	=	981ms,	SD	=	207ms)	[t(15)	=	5.68,	p	<	.01].		The	 difference	 in	 RT	 between	 painful	 and	 non-painful	 trials	 (‘empathic	interference	effect’)	was	calculated	for	each	participant.	Group	analyses,	using	a	2	 (alexithymia	 group)	 x	 2	 (ED	 group)	 ANOVA	 indicated	 that	 empathic	interference	effect	was	significantly	greater	 in	 the	high	alexithymia	(M	=	38ms,	
SD	=	27ms)	 than	 the	 low	alexithymia	group	(M	=	16ms,	SD	=	32ms)	 [F(1,39)	=	5.53,	p	=	.024,	ŋ	=	.12,	95%	CI	for	ŋ	(0,	.32)].	A	non-significant	main	effect	of	ED	group	[F(1,39)	=	1.25,	p	=	.27,	ŋ	=	.03,	95%	CI	for	ŋ	(.01,	.06)]	and	non-significant	interaction	 term	 [F(1,39)	 =	 .09,	 p	 =	 .77,	 ŋ	 <	 .002,	 95%	 CI	 for	 ŋ	 (.001,	 .004)]	indicated	that	ED	diagnosis	itself	did	not	impact	upon	the	empathic	interference	effect	(Figure	3).		It	 remained	 possible	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 alexithymia	 was	 due	 to	 co-linearity	between	 alexithymia	 and	 ED	 diagnosis,	 ED	 symptom	 severity,	 or	 depression,	anxiety,	 or	 stress	 symptom	 severity.	 To	 confirm	 that	 this	 was	 not	 the	 case,	 a	series	 of	 six	 ANCOVAs	 was	 performed	 in	 which	 ED	 diagnosis	 or	 symptom	severity	 (EDE-Q	 total	 score),	 along	 with	 depression,	 anxiety,	 or	 stress	 DASS	scores,	 were	 included	 as	 covariates.	 In	 each	 case,	 a	 significant	 main	 effect	 of	alexithymia	 group	 was	 observed	 (all	 Fs	 >	 4.12,	 all	 ps	 <	 .05),	 except	 for	 the	ANCOVA	 controlling	 for	 ED	 group	 and	 anxiety,	 where	 the	 main	 effect	 of	alexithymia	group	fell	to	a	trend	level	[F(1,39)	=	3.88,	p	=	.056].	
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	 Figure	3		When	RTs	on	painful	and	non-painful	trials	were	analysed	separately,	a	two-way	(ED	 group	 x	 alexithymia	 group)	 ANOVA	 for	 painful	 trials	 suggested	 that	individuals	 with	 high	 alexithymia	 (M	 =	 1019ms,	 SD	 =	 212ms)	 made	 slower	responses	to	painful	stimuli	than	did	those	with	low	alexithymia	(M	=	891ms,	SD	=	 183ms)	 [F(1,38)	 =	 4.13,	 p	 =	 .049,	 η	 =	 .11,	 95%	 CI	 for	 ŋ	 (.06,	 .20)].	 A	 non-significant	main	effect	of	ED	group	and	non-significant	ED	group	x	alexithymia	group	 interaction	 suggested	 that	ED	diagnosis	was	unrelated	 to	RTs	 to	painful	stimuli.	An	equivalent	ANOVA	for	non-painful	RTs	revealed	no	significant	effects.	Taken	together,	 these	results	 indicate	that	 the	association	between	alexithymia	and	 Painful-Non-painful	 RT	 difference	 is	 driven	 by	 increased	 RTs	 to	 painful	stimuli,	rather	than	decreased	RTs	to	non-painful	stimuli.			
Discussion	
	The	current	study	was	a	preliminary	investigation	into	empathy	for	others’	pain,	and	 its	 relationship	 with	 alexithymia,	 in	 individuals	 with	 and	 without	 EDs.	Findings	 suggested	 that	 increased	 alexithymia	 was	 associated	 with	 increased	empathic	personal	distress	as	indexed	by	the	empathic	interference	effect	in	an	empathy	 for	pain	 task	 (the	difference	between	 individuals’	RTs	 to	discriminate	hand	 or	 foot	 laterality	 in	 painful	 and	 non-painful	 situations).	 This	 effect	remained	 once	 ED	 diagnosis	 and	 depression	 were	 controlled	 for,	 and	 ED	diagnosis	itself	was	unrelated	to	the	empathic	interference	effect.	Similarly,	self-reported	personal	 distress	was	higher	 in	 the	high	 than	 low	alexithymia	 group,	and	 in	 the	 ED	 than	 control	 group,	 meaning	 that	 high	 alexithymia	 had	 a	particularly	 strong	 impact	 in	 the	 ED	 group.	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 previous	findings	 of	 high	 self-reported	 personal	 distress	 in	 those	 with	 alexithymia	(Guttman	&	Laporte,	2002;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2006;	Patil	&	Silani,	2014)	and	EDs	(Beadle,	Paradiso,	Salerno,	&	McCormick,	2013;	Duchesne	et	al.,	2012;	Guttman	&	Laporte,	 2002),	 and	 a	 relationship	 between	 increased	 personal	 distress	 and	
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alexithymia	in	those	with	EDs.	Conversely,	self-reported	empathy	data	indicated	that	those	with	low	alexithymia	were	more	likely	to	fantasise	and	had	increased	empathic	 concern	 for	 others	 than	 those	 with	 high	 alexithymia.	 ED	 diagnosis	itself,	however,	was	unrelated	to	fantasising	and	empathic	concern,	likely	due	to	the	fact	that	the	two	groups	were	matched	according	to	alexithymia.		The	higher	empathic	interference	effect	(Painful	RT	–	Non-painful	RT)	observed	in	 the	 high	 alexithymia	 group	 parallels	 Gu	 et	 al.’s	 (2012)	 observation	 of	 an	increased	empathic	interference	effect	in	individuals	with	AI	lesions	in	a	similar	task,	and	appears	to	be	driven	by	slower	responses	to	painful	stimuli,	as	opposed	to	 faster	 responses	 to	 non-painful	 stimuli,	 in	 those	 with	 high	 alexithymia.	Alexithymia	has	consistently	been	shown	to	be	associated	with	atypicalities	in	AI	functioning	 (Bernhardt	 &	 Singer,	 2012;	 Moriguchi	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Singer	 et	 al.,	2009),	meaning	similarities	between	individuals	with	high	alexithymia	and	those	with	AI	lesions	are	unsurprising.		It	is	worth	noting	that	where	previous	studies	have	 observed	 reduced	 empathy	 in	 those	 with	 alexithymia	 (e.g.	 Grynberg,	Luminet,	 Corneille,	 Grèzes,	 &	 Berthoz,	 2010;	 Guttman	 &	 Laporte,	 2002;	Moriguchi	 et	 al.,	 2006,	 2007;	 Patil	 &	 Silani,	 2014),	 this	 is	 usually	 when	 the	empathic	 concern	or	 perspective-taking	 facets	 of	 empathy	 are	 analysed.	 In	 the	same	 studies,	 however,	 alexithymia	 was	 associated	 with	 increased	 levels	 of	personal	distress.	Self-report	data	in	the	current	study	showed	the	same	pattern	of	results.	As	the	current	behavioural	paradigm	is	best	characterised	as	assessing	personal	 distress	 (rather	 than	 empathic	 concern),	 an	 increased	 empathic	interference	effect	in	those	with	alexithymia	is	to	be	expected.		There	are	at	least	two	plausible	explanations	for	the	increased	levels	of	personal	distress	 in	 those	with	 alexithymia.	The	 first	 is	 that	 increased	personal	 distress	occurs	due	to	reduced	emotion	regulation	in	those	with	alexithymia.	Individuals	with	 alexithymia	 report	 reduced	 emotion	 regulation	 (Stasiewicz	 et	 al.,	 2012;	Venta,	 Hart,	 &	 Sharp,	 2013),	 and	 atypical	 regulation	 strategies,	 with	 a	 greater	reliance	 on	 maladaptive	 emotion	 suppression,	 rather	 than	 reappraisal	techniques,	when	attempting	to	regulate	their	own	emotions	(Swart,	Kortekaas,	&	 Aleman,	 2009).	 Further,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 simply	 identifying	 and	
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naming	 one’s	 own	 emotional	 state	 serves	 to	 reduce	 the	 intensity	 of	 that	 state	(Foland-Ross	et	al.,	2010;	Lieberman	et	al.,	2007;	Mazefsky	&	White,	2014),	and	impaired	ability	 to	 identify	 and	describe	one’s	 emotions	 (which	 is	 the	defining	feature	of	alexithymia)	would	result	in	reduced	opportunity	to	utilise	this	system	for	 emotion	 regulation.	 As	 AI	 and	 ACC	 are	 known	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 emotional	regulation	 (Goldin,	 McRae,	 Ramel,	 &	 Gross,	 2008),	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 atypical	function	of	these	areas	in	those	with	alexithymia	prevents	these	individuals	from	regulating	 their	 emotional	 state,	 leading	 to	 increased	 personal	 distress,	 and	 in	turn,	delayed	responses	to	painful	stimuli.			The	second	potential	explanation	for	increased	personal	distress	in	alexithymia	is	 that	 self-other	 distinction	 is	 reduced	 in	 these	 individuals.	 When	 viewing	another’s	pain,	one	must	distinguish	between	the	emotional	state	of	the	self	and	the	other,	in	order	to	correctly	attribute	the	painful	state	to	the	other.	As	the	AI	is	known	 to	play	a	 role	 in	distinguishing	between	 representations	of	 the	 self	 and	other	(Denny,	Kober,	Wager,	&	Ochsner,	2012;	Qin	&	Northoff,	2011;	Qin	et	al.,	2012),	 atypical	 function	of	 this	 area	 in	 alexithymia	 (and	 those	with	AI	 lesions)	may	cause	difficulties	making	 this	distinction.	 Indeed,	 recent	evidence	suggests	that	 the	 ability	 to	 automatically	 inhibit	 imitation	 of	 others’	 actions	 (a	 process	known	 to	 rely	 on	 self-other	 distinction)	 varies	 as	 a	 function	 of	 alexithymia	(Sowden,	 Brewer,	 Catmur,	 &	 Bird,	 2016).	 Individuals	 with	 alexithymia	 may,	therefore,	experience	 increased	personal	distress	 in	response	 to	another’s	pain	due	to	less	well-defined	boundaries	between	the	self	and	other.	This	explanation	remains	 consistent	 with	 the	 high	 self-reported	 personal	 distress	 observed	 in	individuals	with	alexithymia	(Guttman	&	Laporte,	2002;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2006;	Patil	 &	 Silani,	 2014);	 others’	 pain	 is	 more	 personally	 distressing	 when	representations	 of	 the	 self	 and	 other	 are	 less	 separable,	 as	 the	 state	 is	 not	attributed	 to	 the	 other	 rather	 than	 the	 self.	 Interestingly,	 this	 explanation	 is	consistent	with	 recent	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 those	with	 alexithymia	 exhibit	poor	interoception	(the	ability	to	detect	the	internal	state	of	the	body)	(Brewer,	Cook,	&	Bird,	2016;	Herbert,	Herbert,	&	Pollatos,	2011;	Murphy,	Catmur,	&	Bird,	2017;	Murphy,	Brewer,	&	Bird,	2017;	Shah,	Hall,	Catmur,	&	Bird,	2016),	and	that	effective	interoception	is	crucial	for	representing	the	self	as	distinct	from	others	
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(Quattrocki	&	Friston,	2014;	Seth,	2013).	 It	 is	worth	noting	 that,	 as	 the	 images	viewed	 in	 the	 current	 paradigm	 were	 presented	 from	 the	 first-person	perspective,	 self-other	 distinction	 may	 be	 particularly	 difficult.	 Whether	 the	increased	 personal	 distress	 observed	 in	 those	with	 alexithymia	 in	 the	 current	paradigm	arises	due	to	poor	emotion	regulation	or	reduced	self-other	distinction	remains	 to	be	 seen,	 but	 as	previous	 evidence	 suggests	 that	both	processes	 are	compromised	 in	 alexithymia,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 both	 contribute	 to	 the	 increased	empathic	 interference	 effects	 in	 the	 current	 task.	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 each	process	contributes	remains	a	question	for	future	research.		In	 contrast	 to	 the	 impact	of	 alexithymia,	ED	 symptomatology	was	unrelated	 to	the	empathic	interference	effect.	In	line	with	the	alexithymia	hypothesis,	it	seems	that	 alexithymia,	 rather	 than	 ED	 presence	 or	 severity	 per	 se,	 contributes	 to	atypicalities	 in	 empathic	 personal	 distress	 in	 these	 individuals.	Where	 atypical	personal	distress	has	previously	been	observed	 in	those	with	EDs,	 this	 is	 likely	explained	 by	 co-occurring	 alexithymia.	 It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	although	EDs	did	not	impact	on	the	empathic	interference	effect,	individuals	with	EDs	 did	 self-report	 increased	 personal	 distress.	 The	 effect	 of	 EDs	 on	 self-reported	personal	distress	was	particularly	pronounced,	however,	in	those	with	co-occurring	 high	 alexithymia,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 alexithymia	 is	especially	 pronounced	 in	 this	 population.	 As	 alexithymia	 has	 been	 found	 to	predict	 a	 number	 of	 emotional	 abilities	 in	 clinical	 groups,	 such	 as	 emotion	recognition	 (Cook	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Oakley	 et	 al.,	 2016),	 empathic	 response	 of	 the	insula	 to	 others’	 pain	 (Bird	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 and	 emotion	 expression	 (Trevisan,	Bowering,	&	Birmingham,	2016)	in	ASD,	and	emotion	recognition	in	EDs	(Brewer	et	 al.,	 2015),	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 alexithymia	 also	 explains	 atypicalities	 in	 other	facets	of	empathy	in	those	with	EDs,	such	as	empathic	concern.	Whether	this	is	the	 case	 remains	 an	 outstanding	 question.	 The	 current	 finding	 allows	 the	literature	 on	 atypical	 empathy	 in	 EDs	 to	 be	 disambiguated,	 suggesting	 that	individuals	with	 EDs	 only	 exhibit	 increased	 empathic	 personal	 distress	 if	 they	have	 co-occurring	 alexithymia.	 Atypical	 empathy	 is	 therefore	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	core	 feature	 of	 EDs,	 although	 examination	 of	 additional	 empathy	 facets	(empathic	concern	in	particular)	in	alexithymia-matched	ED	and	control	groups	
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is	also	necessary	in	order	to	draw	this	conclusion.	The	current	findings	suggest	that	clinical	 treatment	outcomes	may	vary	considerably	 in	 those	with	high	and	low	 alexithymia,	 and	 that	 interventions	 aiming	 to	 improve	 emotional	understanding,	empathy,	and	social	interactions	should	be	tailored	according	to	patients’	alexithymia	severity.		Overall,	the	current	findings	suggest	that,	as	in	individuals	with	ASD	(Bird	et	al.,	2010),	atypical	performance	on	an	empathy	for	pain	task	in	individuals	with	EDs	depends	on	co-occurring	alexithymia,	rather	than	ED	presence	or	severity	per	se.	In	 line	with	 the	 alexithymia	 hypothesis	 (Bird	 &	 Cook,	 2013),	 alexithymia	may	account	 for	 atypical	 empathy,	where	 observed,	 in	 those	with	 EDs.	 Specifically,	the	current	task	implicates	alexithymia	in	increased	empathic	personal	distress,	likely	due	to	a	reduced	ability	 to	regulate	 the	emotional	contagion	experienced	when	viewing	others’	pain,	or	to	reduced	ability	to	distinguish	between	the	self	and	 others.	While	 further	work	 is	 required	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 relative	contribution	 of	 each	 these	 factors	 to	 increased	 personal	 distress	 in	 those	with	alexithymia,	 these	 findings	 have	 implications	 for	 both	 ED	 research	 and	intervention.	 They	 suggest	 that	 research	 concerning	 empathy,	 and	 other	emotional	 processes,	 in	 ED	 populations	 should	 measure	 and	 control	 for	alexithymia	 severity,	 in	order	 to	 independently	 investigate	alexithymia	 and	ED	symptomatology.	 The	 findings	 also	 suggest	 that	 emotion-	 and	 empathy-based	clinical	 interventions	 should	be	 tailored	 to	 individual	 ED	patients	 according	 to	alexithymia	severity.	 	
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Figure	1.	Examples	of	stimuli,	depicting	right	and	left	hands	and	feet	in	painful	and	non-painful	situations.	Stimuli	were	based	on	those	used	by	Gu	et	al	(2012).	
Figure	2.	Bar	graphs	showing	significantly	slower	responses	to	painful	than	non-painful	stimuli	a)	in	both	the	ED	and	control	groups	b)	in	both	the	high	and	low	alexithymia	groups.				
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	Figure	3.	Bar	graph	showing	the	significant	main	effect	of	alexithymia	group,	but	not	ED	group,	on	empathic	interference	effect,	whereby	high	alexithymia	was	associated	with	greater	empathic	interference	effect	than	low	alexithymia.	
